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Abstract. Computing power and flexibility provided by cloud technologies 
represent an opportunity for Smart Grid applications, in general, and for Wide 
Area Monitoring Systems, in particular. Even though the cloud model is 
considered efficient for Smart Grids, it has stringent constraints in terms of 
security and reliability. An attack to the integrity or confidentiality of data may 
have a devastating impact for the system itself and for the surrounding 
environment. The main security risk is represented by malicious insiders, i.e., 
malevolent employees having privileged access to the hosting machines. In this 
paper, we evaluate a powerful hardening approach that could be leveraged to 
protect synchrophasor data processed at cloud level. In particular, we propose 
the use of homomorphic encryption to address risks related to malicious 
insiders. Our goal is to estimate the feasibility of such a security solution by 
verifying the compliance with frame rate requirements typical of synchrophasor 
standards.  
1   Introduction 
Future generations of Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) look at commercial 
cloud architectures as an opportunity to reduce costs, increase data sharing, enhance 
scalability, and improve availability. At the core of WAMs there are PMUs (Phasor 
Measurement Units), which are nowadays used in distribution network context to 
measure and control the status of power grid. PMUs do so through synchrophasors, 
i.e, time-synchronized numbers that represent both the magnitude and phase angle of 
the sine waves found in electricity, which are time-synchronized for accuracy. 
Synchrophasors enable a synchronized evaluation of the phasor through GPS radio 
clock, and are being extensively deployed together with network-based Phasor Data 
Concentrator (PDC) applications for providing a precise and comprehensive view of 
the status of the entire grid. PDC units are in charge of collecting data coming from 
different PMUs and realize the effective computation.  
Prototypal solutions of Cloud-based WAM were proposed [10]. The idea is to capture 
sensors data on a cloud-computing platform, and leverage its facilities to archive the 
data into a standard data collection infrastructure, which can include standard 
databases or grid specific solutions such as OpenPDC [11] to track the system state in 
real-time by performing the variety of analyses at cloud level.  
However, difficulties of sharing data in a secure and low-latency manner limits 
exploitation of this new powerful technology by bulk electric power grid operators.  
In a cloud-based deployment, the PDC application may be exposed to a number of 
threats that affect both confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data going through the 
monitoring system. The Insider Threat [12] is a particularly worrying example. It is 
impersonated by a malicious employee of cloud providers that leverages the 
privileged position to obtain access to sensitive data [20].  
Two solutions are the most accepted against malicious insiders: Trusted Execution 
(TE) and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). There are works proposing the adoption of 
TE, in particular Intel SGX, for enabling the cloudification of SCADA systems 
[15][16][17]. While the adoption of HE for WAMS was still poorly investigated [18]. 
In this paper we propose an approach that enables secure synchrophasor data 
processing in untrusted cloud environments. Our approach is to leverage most recent 
implementations of HE to create and preserve a chain-of-trust from the field data 
collection to the cloud processing, and ensures confidentiality, even against malicious 
insiders. The idea is to encrypt PMU data on field and then transmit such a data to the 
cloud for subsequent storage or processing Synchrophasor measurements are always 
kept encrypted and evaluations like phase comparisons will be performed on ciphered 
data. In this way risks coming from malicious cloud insiders can be addressed and the 
security is preserved. Unfortunately, HE suffers from a non-negligible performance 
overhead, which could made the adoption of this technology impossible for 
synchrophasor data processing, which are characterized from strict frame rate 
requirements. Most-recent schemes like the one adopted in this paper, i.e., TFHE 
[13][14], started to provide very fast results. Our goal is to evaluate the feasibility of 
HE towards secure synchrophasor data processing in untrusted cloud by estimating 
supported frame rates. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on 
HE. Afterwards, Section 3 introduces synchrophasor systems and concepts of Wide 
Area Monitoring. Then, Section 4 defines possible threats in cloud environment. This 
is followed by Section 5 where we provide our solution. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
the document. 
3   Synchrophasor Systems for Smart Grids 
Wide-Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) of power grids is one important application 
from Smart Grid infrastructures. WAMS are composed of distributed measurement 
and control devices, characterized by a hierarchical architecture. A key component of 
WAMS is the Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU). This is the device in charge of 
electrical quantities synchronized measurements, e.g., voltage and current phasors, 
frequency and rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) with an accurate time-tag based 
on the Universal Coordinated Time generally obtained from a GPS receiver or 
through IEEE1588 synchronization. PMUs forward the acquired data to a Phasor Data 
Concentrator (PDC), which collects and aligns the provided measurements before 
send them next higher PDC levels. Ultimately, data arrives to a control center 
application where the overall status of the electric grid is evaluated.   
Originally, synchronized measurements of WAMS were designed for transmission 
systems. After the advent of smart grid frameworks, benefits of Synchrophasor 
technology are moving also to the distribution network. The use of PMUs in the 
distribution network context represents a new challenge: the stand-alone PMUs and 
PDCs could be replaced by dedicated functionalities implemented in Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IEDs) or by existing measurement devices upgraded in order to 
build an Internet of Things (IoT) network with synchrophasor functionality. In a 
Synchrophasor system suitable for distribution grids, several measurement devices 
will be necessary and, in this new scenario, the classical hierarchical architecture can 
be inadequate, since it can be unable to manage many PMUs and/or PMU-enabled 
instruments. A solution can be represented by replacing the hierarchical structure of 
PDCs with a less expensive and rapidly scalable structure based on cloud computing. 
The communication systems used by distribution system operators (DSOs) are 
expected to be shared and/or public. In this case, the bandwidth available for devices 
involved is strictly dependent on the type of communication channel adopted. 
Normally, in transmission system WAMS, PMUs send data at a constant rate of 50–
60 frames per second (fps) to guarantee the monitoring of dynamic events. The choice 
of 50 or 60 frames mean different supported frame rates (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1 – Synchrophasor frame rate according to IEEE Std C37.118.2™-2011 
 
 
The standard says: “The actual rate to be used shall be user selectable. Support for 
other reporting is permissible, and higher rates such as 100 frames/s or 120 frames/s 
and rates lower than 10 frames/s such as 1 frame/s are encouraged”.  
That is, the minimum accepted may be 1 frame per second. 
4 Threats in a Cloud Environment 
While, on one hand, cloud computing is capable of offering huge benefits to Smart 
Grid systems in terms of IT cost saving and reliability. On the other hand, it opens to 
a number of security risks that cannot be underestimated. As evidenced by Coppolino 
et al. [2], applications running in the untrusted cloud are exposed to well-known 
attacks, which have been around for years but that gained prominence again because 
of the large adoption of cloud computing. These include attacks aiming at violating: i) 
availability by, e.g., flooding targeted machines (Denial of Service (1)); ii) data 
confidentiality/integrity by, e.g., altering communication channels [21] (Traffic 
Hijacking (2)) or landing on the system to subsequently launch an attack (Account 
Hijacking (3)). Besides these, the taxonomy considers other attacks, which in turn are 
typical of the cloud universe. That is, those perpetrated by: 
 Internal users who own a Virtual Machine (VM) and exploit flaws in the 
hypervisor (Shared Technologies Vulnerabilities (4)) to attack another VM 
instance. 
 The Cloud Provider – embodied by disgruntled employees or administrators 
– that leverages its privileged position to get access to an unprecedented 
amount of information and on a much greater scale (Malicious Insiders (5)). 
The latter is definitely the most worrisome category of attackers who can easily cover 
their actions and go undetected for years. It is even more worrying in the context of 
Smart Grid since the impact on the external environment could be destructive. Attacks 
to the integrity, e.g., could have effects on the capability to provide correct commands 
to the actuators, and also acquire the right measurements from sensors. This entails 
that operators may assume that the status of the infrastructure is normal since all 
measured parameters have the expected values but this is not the case. Equally 
important is the availability of WAMS applications. Attacks like DoS, in fact, may 
cause corruptions on the status of the infrastructure, hardware failures, and, more 
importantly monitoring service outage. In the case of critical infrastructures, e.g., this 
could mean risks to human lives. Finally, attacks to confidentiality would imply that 
the adversary either infers the current state of the Smart Grid.  
 
5  Proposed Solution 
Figure 1 reports the high-level architecture of our proposed solution. PMUs gather 
data from sensors deployed on-field and send it to different layers of PDCs up to the 
PDC gateway, at the top. This unit is in charge of encrypting data – in a homomorphic 
fashion – and, then, establishing a TLS secure communication with its counterpart at 
cloud level to create an authenticated channel. Hence, the acquired encrypted 
measurements are sent via this secure channel. At cloud level, the synchrophasor data 
is received and sent over a distributed message-based bus (e.g., ZMQ) to different 
Microservices (MS), i.e., small independent software units that interact each other 
through messages. Microservices are a new way of conceiving applications 
architectures, which fit much better for distributed applications like those for cloud 
platforms. In our work, besides providing and storing measurements, MSs perform 
also those mathematical functions needed by the WAMS case study. 
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 Figure 1 – Proposed Solution 
 
In particular, we identified two mathematical operations to be realized on 
homomorphic encrypted data for synchrophasor evaluations, i.e.: phase subtraction 
and phase comparison. From a practical point of view, this meant the definition of a 
dedicated logical Boolean circuit – composed of gates having homomorphic support – 
in which ciphered bits will go through to carry out the protected computation.  
Figure 2 shows the final scheme of the logical circuit used, which is composed of a 
full subtractor and a comparator, organized in sequence.  
 
 
Figure 2 – Logical circuit for HE synchrophasor evaluations 
Our implementation used the widely-accepted APIs of TFHE [13], which is based on 
the Chillotti et. al HE algorithm [14]. It must be noticed that each gate of the logical 
circuit introduces an overhead. Hence, particular attention must be put on the number 
of gate levels to be created. The deeper is the circuit, the higher is the overhead of the 
overall calculus. To have an idea, we evaluated the execution time of most critical 
logical gates (e.g. AND, OR, MUX). We obtained that binary gates require on 
average 8.1ms, while the MUX took 20.4ms using an Intel Xeon E3-1270 v5 CPU 
with 4 cores at 3.6 GHz, having 8 hyper-threads (2 per core), 8 MB of cache, and 64 
GB of memory. 
To improve the performance, we took advantage of the bit-wise nature of 
homomorphic operations and were able to reduce the amount of computations. The 
system elaborates group of bits from the most significant to the least significant ones. 
In this way, only in the worst case, the entire word is evaluated. Moreover, we 
optimized the system by using a particular implementation of Fast Fourier Transform, 
i.e., FFTW3, which is 3x times faster than the default Nayuki implementation. 
Finally, we ran tests on our developed WAMS. We used the OpenDSS 
comprehensive electrical power system simulation tool for simulating the WAMS 
data and properly evaluate the homomorphic computations. Results obtained are the 
following: 330.4ms in the best case and 651.3ms in the worst case. This means that 
the only standard rate that may be supported by a WAMS having homomorphic 
encryption is 1 frame per second, i.e., the minimum defined in IEEE Std 
C37.118.2™-2011.  
6   Conclusion 
This paper discussed an approach for securing Wide Area Monitoring Systems 
running in cloud environments, and therefore exposed to dangerous attacks from 
malicious insiders on sensitive data. The solution proposed leverages homomorphic 
encryption for executing protected synchrophasor computation. Our goal was to 
evaluate the feasibility of such an approach and understand the impact on the overall 
performances. In fact, requirements of data processing rates declared in 
synchrophasor standards are strict and it is important to verify the compliance of the 
system that works on homomorphic encrypted data. 
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